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"Fortunately, I'm a good scientist and not one of those evil philosophers,
otherwise all my thoughts would be automatically false!"
(Auguste Rodin. The Thinker.
Source)
1) J. Ferenc (2008-March-30-1)
2) J. Ferenc (2008-March-30-2)
3) J. Ferenc (2008-April-03)
4) S. Jetchick (2008-April-09)
5) J. Ferenc (2008-April-13)
6) S. Jetchick (2008-April-19)
7) J. Ferenc (2008-April-21)
8) S. Jetchick (2008-May-03)
9) J. Ferenc (2008-May-04-1)
10) J. Ferenc (2008-May-04-2)
11) S. Jetchick (2008-May-05)
12) J. Ferenc (2010-Feb-06)
13) J. Ferenc (2010-Feb-13)
14) J. Ferenc (2010-Feb-21)
15) S. Jetchick (2010-Feb-23)
16) J. Ferenc (2010-Feb-23)
17) J. Ferenc (2010-Feb-26)
18) J. Ferenc (2010-Feb-26-2)
19) S. Jetchick (2010-March-17)
20) J. Ferenc (2016-October-12)
-----Original Message----- From: J. Ferenc Sent: 30 mars 2008 14:24 To: stefan.jetchick Subject: Dear Stefan Jetchick (Re: Science questions) Dear Stefan Jetchick, My name is Jason Ferenc. I find your website charming; if I could make facial expressions as lively as yours, I could go into theater! I work with your [...] of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, where I am an undergraduate. The conversation one day drifted onto the subject of your website, to which I went, and with which I have become increasingly intrigued. I am writing to you because in your article "Isn't believing in Science anti-scientific?" you ask a series of questions about science, apparently inviting response. I would like to try to answer some of those questions with you, if you are still inclined to hear answers. I would be interested in hearing your thoughts. I fear that my answers may be too verbose, and that you will never read them. Oh, well... Question numbers are as appear in your article: 2.1) Science is any systematic means of acquiring knowledge, broadly. I think its usual use in modern speech is to refer to the system of acquiring knowledge using the experimental-or, more generally, the "scientific"-method. By the way, the latter is the sense in which I will use the word here. 2.2) I suppose one could classify knowledge into as many different types or categories as one pleases. I would argue that there is only one type of knowledge. Knowledge is knowledge, just like water is water. But is it really water in that cup? Knowledge which has been scientifically derived is better because it is testable. Science agrees that the senses are reliable, and always tries to find ways to make any knowledge testable in such a way that it-or its components-can be reliably perceived by our senses, or else to find ways to prove a thing by building upon elements which can, at some level, be oberved and verified. A superstitious belief (e.g. "If I don't walk around my bed three times with a candle and say 'Ohm, zigamwhey' five times, then at precisely midnight, my pillow will turn into a giant chicken and peck my eyes out.") can and should be tested. Once this theory has been tested scientifically (experimentally), then you might say that you now have "scientific knowledge" on that subject. The most important point, I think, is this: the superstitious knowledge could be completely true. Or it could be completely false. Or it could be partly true and partly false. The problem is, we just don't know. A system of knowledge which is infused with an unknown amount of error, and with no reasonably reliable way of separating the error from the truth, is useless. 2.3) Science does not teach truth. As Indiana Jones said, "Science seeks facts, not truth. If it's truth you're after, the philosophy class is right down the hall." Truth is the absolute reality of the universe. Again, I would argue that there is only one type of truth. The real difference is how our perception of that truth is obtained. Science does argue that since humans cannot perceive truth directly, "truth" (knowledge of truth) obtained from difference sources and using different methods may be more or less reliable. As an obvious example, there is only one truth about what your next door neighbor's house looks like (sophistical convolutions aside). I can certainly espouse an opinion about what your neighbor's house looks like, using the technical method known as "guessing," and I could conceivably be correct. You can make a statement on the same subject, using the technical method of "looking at it", and you could conceivably be wrong. But logically, information from you on the subject is likely to be far more reliable. Still: one truth, different perceptions; one statue, different vantage points. [Have you ever read St. Augustine, "On Free Choice of the Will," Book Two? I very strongly recommend it, as it addresses parts of this subject very nicely (and in about 30 pages, if my memory serves). In fact would love to hear your views on it if you have read it.] Short answer: The goal of the scientific method is to ensure that the individual has the best possible vantage point before making the observation. This ensures that our perception of the one truth is as unclouded as possible. But science does not teach truth. Science gives a method to more clearly perceive the truth, and only in those areas of knowledge amenable to physical observation. 2.4) Um, I don't know. With a typewriter? What do you mean? 2.5) Statistics are merely a collection of observations which may then be analyzed using practical mathematical principles in order to yield a complete picture of the subject of analysis. For example, if I measure the skirt length of hundreds of women walking out of a certain building, I can find the most popular skirt length. This is not the type of information which I could obtain from a single observation. It requires multiple observations. Further, the more observations I have made, the more accurate my calculated "most popular skirt length" will be. That is statistics in a nutshell. Statistics do not speak for themselves. They illustrate facts, and no more. Suppose, for example, we measure the average skirt lengths of women leaving a business tower and also an hourly-rate motel in the red light district. We find that the average skirt lengths are significantly* different. In fact, we find that the average skirt lengths of the women leaving the hourly-rate motel are often much shorter that those of the businesswomen. You might very quickly reach certain specific conclusions after having heard these facts. You might, in fact, conclude that one group of women is perhaps more sexually promiscuous than the other. But the statistics themselves don't tell us this - that is a separate conclusion which must be supported on its own evidence. *This is where statistics comes in really handy. How different is significantly different? The mathematics of statistical analysis can take two groups of data and tell us the percent probability that the differences between these groups of data would arise by chance. 2.6) Give specifics. Generally the scientific method indicates experimentation, observation, and extrapolation from experimentation. Each branch of science operates in its own field, but the concepts are very much the same. 2.7) A world-renowned book on "science" itself might be Discourse on Method by Rene Descartes. I'm not quite certain. Since science strongly discourages reliance on authority of any kind to presume the truth of statements, there is no such thing as a "Science Bible." In science, reality itself is the bible, and the books on science are just people's interpretation of that physical reality. The only stipulation is that you must "read the bible" (that is, look to physical reality for your answers). 2.8) Ah, that's what I thought you meant to begin with. Science is pretty well characterized by the scientific method. Science is simply a systematic way of obtaining an accurate perception of truth. If you want a book that is about science, but not about method, then you'll simply be looking at a catalogue of all the conclusions which have been reached using (or claiming to use) the scientific method. That is what fills libraries across the world. My own thoughts: Science looks to the observable world for its answers. It does not deny the existence of things which cannot be observed, nor does it support them. It simply does not speak on those matters. "Science," in the modern sense, is inextricably connected to the physical world. That's literally what it is all about, since the basic idea of science is that experimental results be verified by one's own senses, and from these definite results we make inferences, which lead to theories from which specific and, ideally, testable deductions can be made. Any person who dares to say anything about religion using science (aside from simply saying, "there is no evidence presently available to either support or disprove...and no foreseeable way of obtaining it.") is not a scientist, since, as I have said, science proper simply has nothing to say about things which are not a part of the natural world. Whether philosophy is "unscientific" depends upon exactly what is meant by the statement.. I am given to understand that logic is a form of philosophy. Logic is relied heavily upon to interpret the results we get from the scientific method. If, using the scientific method, we determine that Mycobacterium tuberculosis bacteria are only found in humans which display symptoms of tuberculosis, and if from these facts we deduce that all frogs are princes in disguise, then the facts have not done us much good, have they? Without logic, all of the experiments in the world could not yield useful conclusions. Mind, science no doubt could help to verify the conclusions to which logic leads us, and in this way logic becomes verifiable and amenable to the scientific method. I believe that often when people try to make arguments in the name of "science", they are really arguing in the name of logic (or more broadly, philosophy, or more broadly, knowledge, or more broadly, truth). Religion also argues in the name of truth. The only lesson which science teaches us in areas not directly connected to the natural world is to always keep your eye on the ball: who is in a position to perceive truth, and what likelihood do they have of being correct? Are they speaking about actual, sensible things, or are they just making wild assumptions? By the way, your neighbor's house is yellow with purple stripes. It's the truth. Yours most sincerely, J. Ferenc Amherst, Mass. P.S. - You put out a call for grammatical errors to be pointed out to you. In sec. 2.9 of "Isn't believing in Science Unscientific?" you say "world-renown."
-----Original Message----- From: J. Ferenc Sent: 30 mars 2008 22:47 To: Stefan Jetchick Subject: RE: Dear Stefan Jetchick (Re: Science questions) Dear Stefan, Good evening, and thank you for responding so incredibly promptly. Don't feel at all rushed to read my email. A big contract? As far as me being able to yank anybody out of their ignorance, I wouldn't hold my breath! I'd like to think of us as making a mutual inquiry into a subject. I haven't any problem with you posting our conversation on your website, if you want. As a general rule, I try to avoid having my name appear on the internet. You may call me ["Mr. X11" ...] or else any other name which strikes your fancy. As long as it isn't "Mr. Blockhead"!! :) By the way, in my other e-mail I state that science argues that humans cannot directly perceive truth (absolute reality). I then carelessly proceed to speak of "perceiving the truth"! Whenever I speak of perceiving truth, what I mean is "to perceive things with our senses, or with our minds, which enable us to form a mental image of the truth." Best of luck with your work! - J. Ferenc
-----Original Message-----
From: J. Ferenc
Sent: 3 avril 2008 19:56
To: stefan.jetchick
Subject: Some further thoughts on science and reality
Dear Stefan,
My apologies at sending you more drivel before you have even had the
chance to respond to my first email with a request never to email you
again!
In Section 3.6 of «Public Enemy #1: Religious Obscurantism» you
reference several people who make statements concerning science, in a
context which seems to imply that you believe the assertions are
false. Your quotes are indicated with italics. My thoughts:
3.6.1) "Elusive Truth". Karl Popper said science cannot prove a
theory is true, but only that a theory is false ("falsifiability").
"Hence, the best that science could do was to offer numerous
conjectures, refute the worst with contrary data, and accept the
survivors in a tentative manner. But that implies that although "we
search for truth, we can never be sure we have found it"" [Karl
Popper, quoted in Gauch 2003, p. 82].
But the statement is, in a way, true. All observations are true in
and of themselves, if they are accurate. But they are useful to us
as thinking creatures only inasmuch as they help us to verify
theories which will predict future occurrences and explain past ones.
It has been said, «You can prove something a thousand times, but you
only have to disprove it once.» This seems to be true, because our
experiments to prove those theories will sometimes be contaminated by
our own theories (or lack of theory).
As an example: I propose the theory that heavier objects will fall
faster than lighter objects. We have a pebble, and a piece of paper.
To demonstrate the truth of my theory, I drop the pebble and the
piece of paper from the same height at the same time. The pebble
strikes the ground first. I have just proven my theory as true in
this case. I repeat the experiment. I have proven it yet again.
You object that perhaps there is something peculiar to the properties
of rocks and feathers, and that we ought to try other objects. We
perform the experiment with a nail and a feather, having the same
results.
All afternoon we perform experiments: rock and paper, nail and
feather, rubber ball and cotton wisp, acorn and leaf.....each time
the heavier object falls faster than the lighter one. It will not be
until one of us, perhaps by chance, takes the paper and crumples it
into a ball before dropping it that we will realize that something is
wrong with the theory. This single observation has set into doubt a
theory that was seemingly proved a hundred times over. That's the
thing about theories: you can prove them correct as many times as you
like, but that does not mean that one day an observation will not be
made which will necessitate a modification of theory which had worked
so well up to that point. It is when the theory is proved wrong that
knowledge becomes modified.
3.6.2) "Underdetermined Theory". According to Popper, all
observations are "contaminated" with theory. "But if observations are
theory-laden, that means that observations are simply theories, and
then how can one theory falsify (never mind verify) another theory?
I think that Popper could have phrased his assertion a bit better. I
think I understand what he might be trying to say, though. I assert
that all observations are true, inasmuch as they are accurate. But
which observations we choose to make, and our evaluation of the
importance of these observations, can be influenced by our
preexisting theory, or our lack of a theory. As a perfect example,
in the series of hypothetical gravity experiments above, our lack of
realization of the potential effect of air resistance on the
manifestation of gravity's force caused us to neglect to control for
that variable in the design of the experiment. When we first
designed the experiment with the feather and stone, we had no idea
about air resistance; for all we knew, light had just as much of an
effect on gravity and we might have tried performing the experiment
in a darkened room. So, our own theory (or lack of theory), will
effect the observations which are made, and the significance which is
ascribed to these observations.
Curiously, the full implications of this little complication were not
fully grasped by Popper, but by Imre Lakatos: not only are scientific
theories not verifiable, they are not falsifiable either" [quoted in
Gauch 2003, p. 84].
Obviously this must be false, since part of the very definition of a
theory (as opposed to an hypothesis) is that it makes predictions
which are falsifiable.
If I assert that «Person X is a violent madman and it is only a
matter of time before he beings a Tommy gun to work and blows
everybody away," then this is merely an hypothesis, and it can never
be disproved (assuming, for the sake of argument, that Person X has
an indefinite lifespan). But if I say, «Person X will bring a Tommy
gun to work sometime during the third week of January,» then I have
turned my hypothesis into a true theory, which can then be tested.
Of course, our entire knowledge of the world is based only on
theories (beyond, that is, the famous cogito ergo sum), but this does
not mean that, within the theoretical framework of our total
worldview, theories cannot be falsified.
3.6.3) I agree.
3.6.4) "Redesigned Goals". Traditionally, Science has had the goals
of rationality, truth, objectivity and realism. But Feyerabend and
others like him, fighting against the so-called "tyranny of truth",
claim that "Equal weight should be given to competing avenues of
knowledge, such as Astrology, Acupuncture and Witchcraft" [Paul
eyerabend, quoted in Gauch 2003, p. 88].
This is simply non-sense, because no reason is offered why
«Astrology, Acupuncture, and Witchcraft,» should given equal weight.
Therefore, Feyerabend's assertions can only be met with a shrug of
the shoulders. I would argue that they are not given equal weight
because they are apparently incompatible with experimental science.
This does not mean that we are biased: they are considered on equal
ground. Just as soon as one of these «avenues of knowledge» succeeds
in proving the accuracy of a theory, due consideration will be given
to it.
3.1) Philosophy is no longer considered a Science. This seems to be
caused by an incorrect definition of "Science", and a lack of
knowledge of the "Philosophia Perennis" (or correct philosophical
tradition)
I agree that any systematic means of acquiring knowledge is,
technically, a «science.» This is practically part of the definition
of the word itself. I agree that pure philosophy should not be
denied confidence of ability to prove theories correct with the same
rigor as experimental science.
I do think that perhaps, merely for the sake of lingual convenience,
the newer connotation of the word «science" which refers exclusively
to "mechanical" or «experimental science» (natural philosophy) is not
bad. Why have two words which mean the same thing, when a useful
distinction can be made between them, and the poor writer is thereby
spared the trouble of saying «experimental philosophy» when everybody
knows perfectly well what he means if he just refers to modern
«science»?
I do not mean to disparage non-experimental science, and, as I have
said, without the benefits of non-experimental science (such as
logic), experimental philosophy would be useless to us.
4.1) Ethics is replaced by Sociology. "Good" and "evil" become a
simple consensus of such a population, in such a territory. When you
ask people infected with Religious Obscurantism to define "good" and
"evil", they'll never say: "OK, let's approach that problem
scientifically". On the contrary, they will assert with great
certainty that Science can't define good and evil, even though they
can't define Science or explain what Ethics is!
I think that a definition of «good» and «evil» can perhaps be arrived
at «scientifically.» Though, the correctness of the theory will
depend on the sensibilities of humans, I think, since what is a great
evil to a human might be a great good for a colony of fire ants
looking for a meal!
If you mean «good» and «evil» only in the sense of human thought and
action, then I think I could be fairly easily persuaded that a set of
absolute ethical principles does exist. Although, it may be
impossibly difficult to reduce this set of ethics to practice, given
the complexity of humans and the wide variety of human actions which
could be taken in different lights under different circumstances.
4.2). I agree
4.3). Neither agree nor disagree.
4.4). Ha ha!
Response to "100% of all religions are false (± 1%)"
I am absolutely fascinated by your section entitled 100% of all
religions are false (± 1%). By the way, does this include Roman
Catholicism?
In response to your section, I would argue that knowledge is
knowledge, and what you might call «imperfect knowledge» is simply a
view of the world that relies upon some correct knowledge, and some
things which one thinks are knowledge, but which are in fact pure
mistakes. The difference between our definitions is probably
semantical only.
I have said for a long time that «I believe that there is a God, but
I don't know if there is a God, and I think there is not a God.» I
separate my view of the world into what I know, what I believe, and
what I must think of as true.
First, I would argue that «ignorance» is not a type of knowledge, by
any useful definition. It is merely the absence of knowledge, and
can easily enough be called the absence of knowledge. Is the absence
of water a type of water?
3.3) Science. As you can imagine, this is the ultimate degree of
knowledge, the goal we must pursue. When we know an assertion is
true, it is because we can prove that such a thing is the way it is,
and that it cannot be otherwise. People who have scientific knowledge
say things like: "I know that the Pythagorean Theorem is true, since
this is the proof", or "Whatever you say verbally, you are
nevertheless psychologically unable to doubt that you exist as we
speak, and don't force me to put on my Philosopher's Glove to prove
it to you!" Be also careful with how words are defined. What we call
"Science" these days (like Physics, Chemistry, Biology, etc.) is
composed mostly of highly-probable opinions, strictly speaking.
I partly disagree. I assert that the ultimate degree of knowledge
about the world itself is unattainable by humans, even as to any
single aspect of it (with the one exception). This is, I feel, one
of the distinctions between man and god. I hold, like Descartes,
that all knowledge of the outside world is purely theoretical.
However it is possible to establish it with such a great degree of
certainly that the probability of error becomes mathematically
infinitesimal. These theories we can assign such a great probability
of being true that we can safely rely upon them for all purposes
absolutely. These are the things which we say we «know.» (Which you
refer to as «science,» a good term)
However, I believe that the distinction between what we know as
absolutely true about our own thoughts (Pythagorean theorem), and the
degree of certainty which we can hold about the theories applying to
the outside world is a useful one, and, I would argue, essential to
at least one avenue of proving the existence of a god.
3.4) Belief. Belief, or natural faith (as opposed to supernatural
faith), is accepting as true an assertion, but for extrinsic reasons,
not because we have evidence. In the example given above, the husband
believes there is ham in the fridge. It goes without saying that this
is a very imperfect state of our knowledge.
This is what I would call a «reasonably reliable theory.» That is,
these are theories which have a very great probability of being true,
and upon which one might rely in the conduct of serious affairs. I
disagree with your statement, «accepting as true an assertion, but
for extrinsic reasons, not because we have evidence.» On the
contrary, the husband does not have personal experience which would
conform of the veracity of his wife's assertion, but he does know
that on almost every previous occasion in his memory, an assertion
made by his wife subsequently proved to be true. This is real
evidence which supports the connection between (a) wife saying «ham
in fridge» and (b) ham existing within the fridge. This is the same
as any other induction, is it not? In addition, even personal
experience on your part could fall into this category. I am certain
that there have been times that you have looked into the fridge the
minute before, and could swear that you remember seeing eggs, only to
return and find no eggs! (OK, fine...But it happens to me!) Nobody
said that our own personal recollections are always perfectly
accurate either. I would argue that a person proving themselves to
be a reliable conduit of information is «evidence.» In fact, when a
witness (the wife) gets on the stand and testifies to the jury that
she saw a ham in the fridge on the night of the murder, her statement
is admitted into the record of the court as what? Evidence!
3.2) Opinion. Also known as "probable knowledge". A person with an
opinion has reasons to think that things are probably thus, but
without being certain. Please note that this person knows that he can
be mistaken! You can't "be sure of your opinion", because that's an
oxymoron. People who have opinions say things like: "I think the
Edmonton Oilers are going to win the Stanley Cup this year, for such
and such a reason", or "I'm 75% sure that this is so, because of such
a study, or such an argument", etc.
This is what I call «belief.» I agree that it is an assumption which
stands a good chance of being true, but which also stands a
reasonable chance of being false. I think that the useful, practical
distinction between «reasonably reliable theory» and «belief» (or
«belief» and «opinion»), is that the latter is what experimental
scientists would call a «hypothetical model.» In other words, we
acknowledge that there exists a hole in our knowledge of the world,
so in order to fill that hole, we design a hypothetical scenario
based on our best information up to that point, in order to fill the
hole with something. This «placeholder» knowledge enables us to
think about the unknown in a rational way, allows us to do risk
analysis, design intelligent experiments to prove its accuracy, etc.
The essential, practical difference between a reasonably reliable
theory and a belief (or an opinion, as you call it) is that the one
is a solid building block upon which a person is prepared to base
further knowledge, while the other is a piece of temporary
«placeholder» knowledge which enables us to think intelligently about
the world, and to make best decisions in the absence of more accurate
information, but upon which no more should be built until it is
confirmed. (In other words, in the great pyramid of knowledge, the
"belief" stones should always be on top.)
Of course, the exact point at which a theory becomes certain enough
to use as a base for further knowledge is «up for grabs» depending
upon the individual, but it at least creates a definite distinction
between a «belief» and an «opinion,» since even opinions are based on
some evidence.
By the way, you never say why you «believe» in Jesus Christ.
This is in response to "Error: The Brain In A Vat."
First, the idea which dictates that all of external reality has some
doubt about it's form is hundreds of years old, as you no doubt know,
and is in fact one of the ideas upon modern science is built! The
significance of Rene Descartes' simple statement, «Cogito ergo sum»
is that it is an absolute truth, and the one thing into which
Descartes could introduce no doubt. As I understand it,
Descartes-when modern science was first being born, and men wanted to
bring into question all that was questionable, so that we could know
once and for all what was true-proposed this as the starting point of
all knowledge. So it has remained. It also remains the single fact
about the world that we know for certain: «I exist.» Beyond this
single fact, which is known with absolute certainty, all knowledge
comes from theory of one type or another (I exclude from this
mathematics, for example, since mathematics is an idea internal to
our own minds (cogito), and does not necessarily represent true
knowledge of the outside world).
Second, our uncertainty about the absolute truth of the outside world
does not mean that there is no absolute truth about the outside
world!
I think it is clearly true that, as in the movie «Matrix», our brains
could be plugged into computers which create a virtual world for us
to live in, like a dream, leaving us blissfully unaware of the true
reality, which might be something entirely different. I do not know,
in fact, that I was born. It is hypothetically possible, at least,
that the earth was created last week, complete with relics made to
appear as though they were thousands of years old, and humans with
memories of what they think happened years ago. It is possible that
World War II didn't actually happen; that, in fact, all of human
history as it is recorded in our books and in our memories was
fabricated just last week, when the earth was created.
This is a possibility. Do I think that this possibility is any
serious threat to our scientific understanding of the world? No, of
course not. Occam's Razor (the theory with the fewest assumptions
must be assumed most likely correct) and the Null Hypothesis both
have something to say about this. And it is on these grounds that we
ignore such unsubstantiated possibilities.
Third, we don't have to disprove the possibility that our brains are
in a vat! (As you say). It is totally unnecessary. The probability
that our brains are in a vat is so infinitesimally small, that it
warrants no serious consideration.
"A Skeptic can deny these things with his words, but he can't live as
if he himself really agreed with his silly assertions!"
Of course. The idea of ignoring infinitesimally small possibilities
is not new to us. Every time you open the door to your house, there
is the theoretical possibility that there is a prowler waiting to
kill you. The actual chances? Vanishingly small. So we go about
our houses without care. Only if there is some evidence to support a
particular conclusion does it make sense to seriously entertain the
possibility (e.g., a smashed window).
Why would mere possibilities be any more of an impediment to science?
I hear that quantum theory predicts that, if you were to slap your
hand down upon the table, there is a possibility that your hand would
go straight through the table. But the chances of this occurring are
so remote that if a trillion people slapped their hands a trillion
times a second, it would not likely occur in a million trillion
years. So, does the mere existence of a hypothetical possibility
shake our confidence in the laws of physics one bit? Of course not,
because logic dictates that we build our knowledge upon theories
which are most likely to be correct.
We do not need to dispute the existence of the possibility. We
merely need to ignore it. However, as I have said, I think that the
existence of the possibility is important to at least one avenue of
proving the existence of a god.
Sincerely,
J. Ferenc
Hello J. Ferenc,
Sorry again for the very long delay in answering. As I said,
work, illness and other factors slowed me down.
>> I fear that
>> my answers may be too verbose, and that you will never read them.
I don't have a life, so I read all my e-mails very
carefully!
;-)
Seriously, I think many of my questions were not clear or misleading,
in that article called: "Isn't believing in Science anti-scientific?"
Right from the start, sorry about any confusion caused by my
poorly-worded questions, and thanks for calling those problems to
my attention.
Now, let's look at your answers in detail.
>> 2.1) Science is any systematic means of acquiring knowledge, broadly.
Concedo, if we speak broadly.
A detailed answer, in my opinion, requires a complete Philosophy
textbook (as you know, my favorite one is currently Thonnard).
>> I think its usual use in modern speech is to refer to the system of
>> acquiring knowledge using the experimental - or, more generally, the
>> "scientific"-method.
Concedo.
But one of my claims is that some variants of this modern meaning are
incorrect. I'll try to discuss this here below.
>> I would argue that there is only
>> one type of knowledge. Knowledge is knowledge, just like water is
>> water.
I think my question was not well-worded. So thanks for calling that
to my attention. I re-worded it to say:
2.2) What are the various "types of knowledge", and why is
Science better than the others?
Strictly speaking, Concedo, knowledge is
knowledge. But the word "knowledge", as far as I know, is analogous
(I'm using that word in it's technical sense here). Quick reminder
of the two types of analogy:
"analogy of attribution":
"healthy body" ("prime analog" in this case)
"healthy urine" (sign of health)
"healthy food" (one of the causes of health)
"analogy of proportion":
"Man's mind is alive because it nourishes itself
and grows by assimilating ideas, a bit like a dog is
alive because it nourishes itself and grows by assimilating
dog food."
I'm guessing some of the senses of the word "knowledge" are based
on an analogy of attribution:
"science" as "prime analog"
"opinion" as "imperfect knowledge"
"belief" as "indirect knowlege (based on our trust in someone else's
real knowledge)"
>> Knowledge which has been
>> scientifically derived is better because it is testable.
Concedo, roughly speaking. But we could argue about the
"testable" part. We know with certainty that "2+2=4", or that
"the whole is greater than any one of its part", or "I think
therefore I am", yet we don't need to repeatedly test. We just
need to think about it once.
>> Science
>> agrees that the senses are reliable
Actually, strictly speaking, the question of "Are our senses reliable"
is a philosophical question (the part of philosophy called "Criteriology",
first part of Metaphysics). So if philosophy is not a science, all our
scientific knowledge would need to be based on non-scientific knowledge!
;-)
But we need to define our terms more clearly first.
>> always tries to find ways to
>> make any knowledge testable in such a way that it-or its
>> components-can be reliably perceived by our senses
Concedo, but with a little reservation.
Do you exist mentally? Yes. Is your mental existence
perceptible with the exterior senses (eyes, nose, ears,...)?
No.
Even if you observe that certain brain waves occur
when you are conscious, you still need to be conscious
to say: "OK, measure now, I'm conscious!" Otherwise you'd
never know those brain waves are associated with anything.
Mental existence is absolutely reliably percieved, but not
by our exterior senses. This is very mysterious. True
science observes this fact.
>> to find
>> ways to prove a thing by building upon elements which can, at some
>> level, be observed and verified.
Concedo, if "verified" is not artificially restricted to "verified
by our external senses".
>> A superstitious belief [...] can and should be tested.
Concedo, in the sense that all assertions ideally should be
verified. But of course obviously silly assertions don't need
to be tested (like the example you give). I removed the
expression "superstition" from that question, which was misleading.
>> A system of knowledge which is infused with an unknown
>> amount of error, and with no reasonably reliable way of separating
>> the error from the truth, is useless.
I'm not sure I understand your statement. "A system of knowledge"
that contains no knowledge is somewhat contradictory. But once
again, I think my question was not clear.
>> 2.3) Science does not teach truth. As Indiana Jones said, "Science
>> seeks facts, not truth. If it's truth you're after, the philosophy
>> class is right down the hall."
:-D
Offhand, listening to Hollywood to get reliable information on
Criteriology, seems like listening to homeless hobos to find
out how to perform rocket science or brain surgery!
Webster's Dictionary gives "in truth" as a synonym to "in fact".
A scientist who counts the number of red blood cells on a microscope
slide is seeking for the true number of red blood cells.
If it doesn't pay attention while counting, chances are his cell
count will be false.
Redefining "truth" as "that which is not sought by scientists" is
just a Post-Modernist trick, unrelated to reality. Biologists,
Chemists, Physicists, Philosophers, etc., all pursue truth.
But you're right: my question was not well-worded. I tried to
improve the wording.
>> Truth is the absolute reality of the universe.
"Truth" is an analogous word. When you count the fingers on your
hand, if you count well, the result is "truth". "2+2=4" is a truth.
(Jesus Christ is also The Truth, but that's an advanced topic!)
>> Science does argue that since
>> humans cannot perceive truth directly
Nego.
Look in a laboratory microscope, or in a telescope, or in a chemical
formula, or in a Petri dish, and you will never see the
statement:
"Science says that men cannot perceive truth directly"
That is not an observation of experimental science. It is a
philosphical position (and a bad one at that!)
>> one truth,
>> different perceptions; one statue, different vantage points.
Well, we can argue about that one. That is a common opening
line for sceptics who try to argue that truth doesn't exist.
You'd need to give more details about your position.
>> [Have you ever read St. Augustine, "On Free Choice of the Will,"
Not the whole thing, sorry. I'm currently reading:
THONNARD, François-Joseph, A.A., Traité de vie spirituelle;
à l'école de saint Augustin
It presents an overview of St. Augustine's theology, so I'll
probably get a fairly good idea, but you'd need to indicate
what the connection is with this discussion, to help me out.
>> Short answer: The goal of the scientific method is to ensure that the
>> individual has the best possible vantage point before making the
>> observation.
Concedo, in a way. I'm not sure, because here again, you use
expressions that are sometimes used by Post-Modernists, just before
they start asserting that we can never know truth.
The goal of science is to attain truth, not a vantage point.
>> But science does not teach truth. Science
>> gives a method to more clearly perceive the truth
Well, here again we could agree or disagree depending
on what exactly you are saying.
Strictly speaking, science is the "accident" of our reason
once is has acquired truth through a demonstrative syllogism.
>> only in those
>> areas of knowledge amenable to physical observation.
Nego. See above. Restricting our capability of knowing
truth to only things percieved by our external senses is
not science, but scientism (the prejudice popularised by
Auguste Comte).
>> 2.4) Um, I don't know. With a typewriter? What do you mean?
Sorry, my bad question again. I tried to fix it.
>> the more
>> observations I have made, the more accurate my calculated "most
>> popular skirt length" will be. That is statistics in a nutshell.
Offhand, that sounds perfectly reasonable. (I need to re-read
"Doing Science; Design, Analysis and Communication of Scientific
Research", by Ivan Valiela, 2001, or some better introduction to
statistics in science.)
My concern would be more about the part of statistics used to
find correlations. Science is knowledge through "causes", and
a "cause" in experimental science is "the necessary antecedent
linked to the consequent by Nature's determinism". Sure, you
can describe the average, the standard deviation, the median,
etc., but scientists are really interested in the "why".
Statistics become interesting (and harder to use properly)
when looking for causes. For example, do public campaigns to
distribute condoms exacerbate, reduce or remain neutral to
the spread of AIDS?
>> *This is where statistics comes in really handy. How different is
>> significantly different? The mathematics of statistical analysis can
>> take two groups of data and tell us the percent probability that the
>> differences between these groups of data would arise by chance.
Sounds like what little I remember of my courses.
And "arise by chance" seems like the opposite of "the necessary
antecedent linked to the consequent by Nature's determinism".
So if you can figure out it didn't "arise by chance", then it must
have been caused.
>> 2.6) Give specifics.
Logic is divided in two: formal and material. The last part of
Material Logic is "Methodology", or how to proceed in each Science.
See: Chapter 3: The matter of Sciences or Methodology
(sorry, French only for now)
>> 2.7) A world-renowned book on "science" itself might be Discourse on
>> Method by Rene Descartes.
Hum, Descartes? He claims our external senses are untrustworthy, and
that the only source of scientific certainty
is God (and the argument he offers to prove God's existence is wrong).
If you claim that we must prove God's existence before being able
to scientifically count the number of red blood cells on a
microscope slide, then Descartes is your man!
>> Since science
>> strongly discourages reliance on authority of any kind to presume the
>> truth of statements
"Science"? How about Theology! ;-)
Here is what saint Thomas Aquinas has to say about authority (and
he just repeats what Aristotle said centuries before Christ, and
anyway it's just common sense):
«Locus ab auctoritate, quae fundatur super
ratione humana, est infirmissimus»
("Arguments from authority, when this authority is based
on human reason, are the weakest")
[Source]
>> there is no such thing as a "Science Bible."
Of course, strictly speaking. But there must be some good book out
there about science.
>> In science, reality itself is the bible, and the books on science are
>> just people's interpretation of that physical reality. The only
>> stipulation is that you must "read the bible" (that is, look to
>> physical reality for your answers).
Here again, I could agree with you. I'm a bit afraid because, as usual,
Post-Modernists often use this as a springboard to claim we can
never know reality, only subjective interpretations of it.
(By the way, the Bible itself must be interpreted. But fortunately,
God isn't a jerk, so He supplies the Magisterium to make sure
the interpretation process is correct.)
>> 2.8) [...] If you
>> want a book that is about science, but not about method, then you'll
>> simply be looking at a catalogue of all the conclusions which have
>> been reached using (or claiming to use) the scientific method.
I would roughly agree, but Science can also be studied in itself,
not just in the results it produces.
>> My own thoughts: Science looks to the observable world for its
>> answers.
You need to define "observable", as per my preceding remarks.
>> "Science," in the modern sense, is inextricably
>> connected to the physical world.
Yes, according to the prejudices of Scientism, but not in truth.
>> Any person who dares to say
>> anything about religion using science [...] is not a
>> scientist
Nego.
My next door neighbor is a Sociologist, and he studies religions.
Sociology (when well done) is scientific.
Moreover, the existence of God can be demonstrated, with
certainty. But that is opening up another debate.
>> I am given to understand that logic is a
>> form of philosophy.
... well, the first part of Philosophy.
>> logic becomes
>> verifiable and amenable to the scientific method.
Oops! Here you just lost me.
Logic becomes "verifiable and amenable"? The scientific method
comes from logic, not the other way around, right?
>> I believe that often when people try to make arguments in the name of
>> "science", they are really arguing in the name of logic (or more
>> broadly, philosophy, or more broadly, knowledge, or more broadly,
>> truth).
You "believe"?
;-)
(Strange verb to use!)
I observe that few people who use the words "science" and "philosophy"
know what they are talking about.
>> By the way, your neighbor's house is yellow with purple stripes. It's
>> the truth.
Nego. Red roof with grey stone walls.
>> P.S. - You put out a call for grammatical errors to be pointed out to
>> you.
I owe you at least 4$. Two instances of that mistake, but many more
errors in my texts. Note that the price I pay has no correlation with
the gravity of the mistake, hence the very low pay for all the
hard work you supplied!
>> By the way, in my other e-mail I state that science argues that
>> humans cannot directly perceive truth (absolute reality). I then
>> carelessly proceed to speak of "perceiving the truth"! Whenever I
>> speak of perceiving truth, what I mean is "to perceive things with
>> our senses, or with our minds, which enable us to form a mental image
>> of the truth."
Hum, that sounds like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
When you stick your hand in front of your face, count your fingers,
and declare: "My hand has five fingers", you're percieving a chunk
of physical reality, and describing it accurately. You're telling
the truth. Period. It's the truth. Absolute, certain truth.
>> Best of luck with your work!
"Luck"?
It's God's grace and hard work!
;-)
>> In Section 3.6 of «Public Enemy #1: Religious Obscurantism»
OK, Step 2 of our conversation...
>> It has been said, «You can prove something a thousand times, but you
>> only have to disprove it once.»
This is playing on words, as usual. If it is proven, it's proven. The
reason some assertions are disproven is because they were never proven
to begin with.
In order to figure this out, we need to better define what is a "theory"
in experimental science, and what is a "proof" (strictly speaking, and
then other, looser meanings).
>> As an example: I propose the theory that heavier objects will fall
>> faster than lighter objects.
I think it should be "hypothesis", not "theory", but I understand
your example.
>> It will not be
>> until one of us, perhaps by chance, takes the paper and crumples it
>> into a ball before dropping it that we will realize that something is
>> wrong with the theory.
Well, strictly speaking, something was wrong with the experiment design.
"It turns out that ensuring that the treatment and control differ in
just one aspect that tests the question ... is considerably more
demanding". (p. 79, Valiela 2001)
>> That's the
>> thing about theories: you can prove them correct as many times as you
>> like
Once again, the word "prove" is incorrectly used. What the repeated
experiments did was establish an opinion (probable knowledge). But
by definition, when you have an opinion, you know you could be wrong.
Most of "science" (modern sense of the word) is not "science" (thomist
sense of the word), but opinion (i.e. probable knowledge).
>> but that does not mean that one day an observation will not be
>> made which will necessitate a modification of theory which had worked
>> so well up to that point.
For example, the Law of conservation of Mass. I've heard, in the
experiment described in Section 2 of "Papal Infallibility, and the Stupid Gods",
that now we can measure the amount of mass lost through the emission of
light from the candle. So the Law of conservation of Mass is "wrong"!
But a good scientist would have only concluded "that when you weigh the
whole thing after the candle has burnt down, you will apparently have
the same mass." So he won't be impressed with the Post-Modernist
sleigh of hand claiming that "what used to be a scientific truth has
now been falsified"! On the contrary, it apparently had
the same mass, and still apparently has the same mass after the candle
has burnt! What was true is still true, but his opinion has been
refined.
>> I assert
>> that all observations are true, inasmuch as they are accurate.
Concedo.
>> But
>> which observations we choose to make, and our evaluation of the
>> importance of these observations, can be influenced by our
>> preexisting theory, or our lack of a theory.
Concedo.
>> then I have
>> turned my hypothesis into a true theory, which can then be tested.
For some reason, I think you've flipped "theory" and "hypothesis".
But I agree with your explanation, of course.
>> our entire knowledge of the world is based only on
>> theories
Nego, but then because of your incorrect definition of
"science", that is understandable.
>> This is simply non-sense, because no reason is offered why
>> «Astrology, Acupuncture, and Witchcraft,» should given equal weight.
Well, I'm glad I got that reaction out of you here!
>> pure philosophy should not be
>> denied confidence of ability to prove theories correct with the same
>> rigor as experimental science.
"same rigor"?
Far more rigor! (for some parts of philosophy)
>> to "mechanical" or «experimental science» (natural philosophy)
Philosophy of Nature is not the same thing as experimental science.
>> Why have two words which mean the same thing, when a useful
>> distinction can be made between them, and the poor writer is thereby
>> spared the trouble of saying «experimental philosophy» when everybody
>> knows perfectly well what he means if he just refers to modern
>> «science»?
Because if philosophy isn't a science, neither is modern experimental
science. See my comments above for Criteriology.
>> I do not mean to disparage non-experimental science
That is a contradiction in terms. "Experimental" in the sense of
"being in contact with reality" is absolutely necessary for
science, any science.
>> If you mean «good» and «evil» only in the sense of human thought and
>> action, then I think I could be fairly easily persuaded that a set of
>> absolute ethical principles does exist. Although, it may be
>> impossibly difficult to reduce this set of ethics to practice, given
>> the complexity of humans and the wide variety of human actions which
>> could be taken in different lights under different circumstances.
Hum, here again, you seem to be infected with Post-Modernism and a
lack of knowledge of "What is Morality". But we'd need to have many
hot chocolates and long discussions together.
>> Response to "100% of all religions are false (± 1%)"
>> By the way, does this include Roman
>> Catholicism?
Yes, in the 1 percent.
>> The difference between our definitions is probably
>> semantical only.
I think so (it's my opinion!)
>> I think there is not a God.»
Why?
>> First, I would argue that «ignorance» is not a type of knowledge, by
>> any useful definition.
Concedo. I modified my text.
>> I assert that the ultimate degree of knowledge
>> about the world itself is unattainable by humans
Well, how could you make such an ultimate assertion? We cannot
know absolute truth about the world itself, and you're making
an assertion about the world itself (i.e., that we can't know
it fully).
>> I hold, like Descartes,
>> that all knowledge of the outside world is purely theoretical.
Well, I don't think Descartes would have agreed with you (and
I certainly don't!)
:-)
>> However it is possible to establish it with such a great degree of
>> certainly that the probability of error becomes mathematically
>> infinitesimal.
If you're standing in the middle of a highway, and there is a car
coming toward you, you will be crushed if you stay there and
the car hits you. There is no uncertainty there. That's not a theory.
>> This is what I would call a «reasonably reliable theory.»
Hum. You're losing me here.
>> the husband does not have personal experience which would
>> conform of the veracity of his wife's assertion, but he does know
>> that on almost every previous occasion in his memory, an assertion
>> made by his wife subsequently proved to be true.
That's exactly what I'm saying. The husband has evidence about
the intelligence and good will of his wife, but no evidence
whatsoever about what is in the fridge.
>> This is the same
>> as any other induction, is it not?
No, not at all.
>> and could swear that you remember seeing eggs, only to
>> return and find no eggs!
Concedo, but for dollar bills in my wallet!
;-)
>> her statement
>> is admitted into the record of the court as what? Evidence!
Precisely! The word "evidence" in that context is a perfect example
of "verbal inflation". See #2.2 in:
Verbal Inflation and Impoverished Thought
>> This is what I call «belief.»
Incorrectly.
>> a reasonably reliable
>> theory and a belief (or an opinion, as you call it)
The word "opinion" was invented and used for millenia before
you and I appeared. I'm not inventing that word or its
correct meaning.
>> By the way, you never say why you «believe» in Jesus Christ.
Not in that article (it's in the "Philosophy" section of my web
site, so I try to steer away from religion, and keep that for
the "Lost Sermons" section).
Reasons to believe are given in the part of Theology called
"Apologetics". There are many good books on the topic, some
are listed in my "Some Good Books" section.
>> This is in response to "Error: The Brain In A Vat."
>> [...] and is in fact one of the ideas upon modern science is built!
Nego.
>> So it has remained.
Nego.
>> It also remains the single fact
>> about the world that we know for certain: «I exist.»
Nego.
>> I think it is clearly true that, as in the movie «Matrix», our brains
>> could be plugged into computers [...] when the earth was created. [...]
>> This is a possibility.
Not really, but then I don't smoke pot.
;-)
>> And it is on these grounds [Occam's Razor, etc.] that we
>> ignore such unsubstantiated possibilities.
Concedo, we ignore them, but Nego, about "on these grounds".
>> So we go about
>> our houses without care. Only if there is some evidence to support a
>> particular conclusion does it make sense to seriously entertain the
>> possibility (e.g., a smashed window).
Concedo.
>> I hear that quantum theory predicts that, if you were to slap your
>> hand down upon the table, there is a possibility that your hand would
>> go straight through the table.
Never saw that in the only book I have discussing quantum stuff
(ATKINS, Peter. Physical Chemistry, 6th Ed., 1997.).
But then I don't understand quantum stuff very much.
>> I think that the
>> existence of the possibility is important to at least one avenue of
>> proving the existence of a god.
I'm not sure if I understand you, here.
Cheers!
Stefan
-----Original Message----- From: J. Ferenc Sent: 13 avril 2008 15:54 To: Stefan Jetchick Subject: RE: Some further thoughts on science and reality Dear Stefan, Your "quickie" responses were thorough and thoughtful, and they were a great pleasure for me to read. I cannot guarantee that my writing will be a pleasure to read, but I have endeavored to provide you with the same degree of thoughtfulness. I like your system of "Concedo/Nego/Distinguo" and have decided to try it myself. Well, let's dig in! >> A detailed answer, in my opinion, requires a complete Philosophy >> textbook (as you know, my favorite one is currently Thonnard Currently waiting for an interlibrary loan on this one. Funny, I have ready access to the largest collection of books in Massachusetts (indeed, all of New England), yet none of Thonnard's works are to be found in any of the Five College library systems... >> I think my question was not well-worded...I re-worded it... I have given the revised the question the "blockhead test" (I read it). It is still seems to say, with perfect clarity, exactly what I thought it said before. >> Quick reminder of the two types of analogy: [...] According to at least one source, this is wrong. There are indeed 2 types of analogy, and "analogy of proportion" and "analogy of attribution" are both subtypes of the second kind. See: www.newadvent.org/cathen/01449a.htm, Section II. >> I'm guessing some of the senses of the word "knowledge" are based on >> an analogy of attribution: Well, I suppose that science, opinion, and belief are all analogous to knowledge inasmuch as they all relate to our ability to "know", so, concedo. But, I think you might be rather begging the point, because an analogous sense of the word "knowledge" is not of any great help to us at this moment, and serves only to blur the argument rather than make it clearer. But, yes, I see what you mean. >> We know with certainty that "2+2=4"...We just need to think about it >> once. True, we know with certainty that 2+2=4 because the concept of mathematics is internal to our own minds. It is a mental construct which has no parts that we have not assigned to it. As I say in my previous email: "...I exclude from this mathematics, for example, since mathematics is an idea internal to our own minds (cogito), and does not necessarily represent true knowledge of the outside world). When speaking of the outside natural world, our ability to be certain is based on an imperfect process of discovery. >> strictly speaking, the question of "Are our senses reliable" is a >> philosophical question Agreed. I had this in mind when I wrote "science agrees." My apologies for failing to be clearer. >> Even if you observe that certain brain waves occur >> when you are conscious, you still need to be conscious >> to say: "OK, measure now, I'm conscious!"... Agreed. I have no intention of excluding our interior senses from the statement "perceived by the senses." Much of natural science involves testing human reactions which can only be sensed by the internal sense of the subject. >> Concedo, if "verified" is not artificially restricted to "verified >> by our external senses". Agreed. >> I'm not sure I understand your statement. "A system of knowledge" >> that contains no knowledge is somewhat contradictory. But once >> again, I think my question was not clear. No, it was my response which was unclear; I apologize. By "system of knowledge" I meant: "The catalogue of all conclusions which have been properly reached using a given method for obtaining or instilling knowledge." Thus, the teachings of Jim Jones were a "system of knowledge" though the "system" did not yield true knowledge (or yielded 3% truth and 97% fiction). My point is, if you were living in Jones' compound, and you had no way of separating his true statements from his false ones, then for practical purposes, everything he said would be 100% worthless. >> Offhand, listening to Hollywood...seems like listening to homeless >> hobos to find out how to perform rocket science or brain surgery! In other words, perfectly reliable! >> Webster's Dictionary gives "in truth" as a synonym to "in fact". A >> scientist...If it doesn't pay attention while counting, chances are >> his cell count will be false. I did not intend for Indiana Jones to stand close scrutiny, but this does raise the interesting point - like Descartes' Dream Argument: How can the scientist ever know that he is paying perfect attention? I myself have spent a few hours hunched over a phase-contrast microscope looking at little swimming friends, and I can say that they will occasionally pull the "refrigerator eggs" trick on me! >> Redefining "truth" as "that which is not sought by scientists" is >> just a Post-Modernist trick... Yes, but I do not assert that scientists do not seek truth. I assert that they do. However, I assert that the collection of facts by itself is insufficient to enable us to approximate this truth. (See my previous email where I spoke about Mycobacterium tuberculosis and princes in disguise.) >> But you're right: my question was not well-worded. I tried to >> improve the wording. Stop that!! Clearly it was my answer which was faulty! >> (Jesus Christ is also The Truth, but that's an advanced topic!) You're teasing me! :-) >> Look in a laboratory microscope, or in a telescope, or in a chemical >> formula, or in a Petri dish, and you will never see the statement: >> "Science says that men cannot perceive truth directly" >> That is not an observation of experimental science. It is a >> philosophical position Agreed. >> (and a bad one at that) That remains to be seen (by my imperfect sight, at least!)... >> >> one truth, different perceptions; one statue, different vantage >> >> points. >> ...That is a common opening line for skeptics who try to argue that >> truth doesn't exist. You'd need to give more details. With pleasure! I do not argue that truth does not exist. I am perfectly content with the concept of an ultimate truth. I don't even argue that it is impossible to have a perfectly accurate perception of that truth. I merely argue that we can never be certain that any of our perceptions are, in fact, perfectly accurate. This is why no natural scientific question will ever be closed with complete finality that it is impossible that some new piece of evidence could not surface. It has happened many times before! >> Strictly speaking, science is the "accident" of our reason once is >> has acquired truth through a demonstrative syllogism. How very Aristotelian of you! Although I might be inclined to believe that it is no "accident." >> Nego. See above. Restricting our capability of knowing >> truth to only things perceived by our external senses is not >> science, but scientism (the prejudice popularised by Auguste Comte). Concedo, for the broad definition of science. But I had previously made it clear that I was speaking only of natural science and must therefore say nego, with the proviso that I did not mean to exclude internal sense. >> Logic is divided in two: formal and material. The last part of >> Material Logic is "Methodology", or... Mmm, you sound awfully resolute for such an arbitrary statement. Perhaps a better statement might be: "Logic has been divided in two by this author, who then chooses, in his work, to designate his final subdivision as..." By another system, logic is divided into: informal, formal, symbolic, and mathematical. >> Hum, Descartes? He claims... If you claim...then Descartes is your >> man! There are many aspects of Descartes' arguments that modern natural science does not incorporate, and the ideas that our senses are always untrustworthy is one of them. In addition, his proof of the existence of God is unnecessary to much of the importance of his method. As an interesting side note, it has been suggested by some that Descartes inserted his statements on the existence of God in order to appease the censors. It is undeniable that this was a serious concern, and within "Discourse on Method," Descartes himself points out that he was at first reluctant to publish the work because of the recent trial of Galileo by the Roman Catholic Church in 1633, just four years earlier. >> "Science"? How about Theology! ;-) I don't know. I thought you were going to tell me! :-) >> Here is what saint Thomas Aquinas has to say about authority (and he >> just repeats what Aristotle said centuries before Christ, and anyway >> it's just common sense): [...] On its face, this would seem to be roundabout way of insulting human reason, rather than a condemnation of presumption of truth based only on authority, especially when Aquinas goes on to say, "...for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest." [Source] >> There must be some good book out there about science. I do not feel qualified to nominate a specific text. >> Here again, I could agree with you. I'm a bit afraid because, as >> usual, Post-Modernists often use this as a springboard to claim we >> can never know reality, only subjective interpretations of it. You are right to be hesitant, for I am standing upon that very springboard! (But from that springboard I believe I am launched to conclusions about our knowledge of the world which are not in material conflict with your own, so I really fail to see what the big deal is.) >> (By the way, the Bible itself must be interpreted. But fortunately, >> God isn't a jerk, so He supplies the Magisterium to make sure the >> interpretation process is correct.) Does he? >> Science can also be studied in itself, not just in the results it >> produces. Concedo. >> >> "Science," in the modern sense, is inextricably >> >> connected to the physical world. >> Yes, according to the prejudices of Scientism, but not in truth. Well, that does depend on what me mean by "science," doesn't it? Since I did explicitly say in what sense I was using the word, I will have to say nego. But using the broader sense of the word "science," concedo, of course. >> My next door neighbor is a Sociologist, and he studies religions. >> Sociology (when well done) is scientific. Concedo. >> Moreover, the existence of God can be demonstrated, with certainty. >> But that is opening up another debate. That is where St. Augustine comes in. See postscript. >> >> logic becomes >> >> verifiable and amenable to the scientific method. >> Oops! Here you just lost me. Logic becomes "verifiable and >> amenable"? The scientific method comes from logic, not the other way >> around, right? Well, right. I was trying to say that the conclusions to which logic leads us in specific cases can often be verified (at least in natural science). Therefore, the use of logic does not introduce an unknown variable into our conclusions, since the conclusions can often be tested to some degree through direct observation. It is no doubt true that the development of logic must be guided by observation, and the scientific method ensures that these observations are as accurate and frequent as possible. >> Hum, that sounds like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. LOL!!!! :-DD >> When you stick your hand in front of your face, count your >> fingers,and declare: "My hand has five fingers", you're percieving a >> chunk of physical reality, and describing it accurately. Are you? Tell me, how do you know you perceive correctly? Have you ever seen optical illusions? If you were in the boxing ring, and your trainer was anxiously asking you, "How many fingers am I holding up?" how certain would you be then? My point being, our senses are fallible, and we are not even aware of all of the things which affect them, or whether we are currently being affected. When you are in the boxing ring, you do have reason to believe that your senses are impaired. But, if you had never been hit in the head before, you would not know the effect that this had upon your senses. Similarly, there could be other factors which affect our senses, but which we might not account for because we have no familiarity with them. In other words, it is impossible to control for all possible variables in any experiment involving the natural world (and I include our eyes as part of this natural world). This is the reason why it is impossible to develop the "perfect experiment" and why their will always be some doubt about every natural scientific principle. >> You're telling the truth. Period. It's the truth. Absolute, certain >> truth. I agree that it is most likely that when I look at my hand and count five fingers there are, in fact, five fingers. I would, indeed, bet my life upon it. But that does not mean that I can make the statement with the same certainty as cogito ergo sum. My hand is not something which dwells within my mind (just the concept of my hand dwells there). All of the information about my hand comes to me through conduits of information which might not be absolutely accurate. I think we can agree, at least, that these conduits are practically absolutely accurate. >> >> It has been said, «You can prove something a thousand times, but >> >> you only have to disprove it once.» >> This is playing on words, as usual. If it is proven, it's proven. Concedo. I was careless in my use of words. (The saying was one my high school physics teacher was fond of). What I should have said was, "A theory can be proved correct in specific situations a thousand times, and from these specific situations, you can induce that it will be correct in all situations, but this does not mean that one day a situation in which the theory unexpectedly fails will not present itself." >> In order to figure this out, we need to better define what is a >> "theory" in experimental science, and what is a "proof" (strictly >> speaking, and then other, looser meanings). I propose the following standard definitions (mostly pulled from my trusty Random House College Dictionary, Revised): Proof: Evidence sufficient to establish a theory as true, according to a given level of rigorousness, which may be absolute or somewhat less than absolute. Theory: A general group of coherent propositions used as principles of explanation for a phenomenon or class of phenomena. A good theory must explain previous observations without contradiction, and must also make testable predictions about observations which have not yet been made. In addition, the theory must not conflict in any of its parts with other theories which are accepted as true, unless those theories are to be called into question. Hypothesis: A rational conjecture put forth as a possible explanation accounting for known facts or phenomena. A hypothesis is a provisional conjecture put forth to guide investigation, and either has yet to be proven, or else is incapable of proof to any satisfactory degree of rigorousness, either because it fails to make testable predictions which might support it, or because such supporting information is not currently available. >> >> It will not be until one of us, perhaps by chance, takes the >> >> paper and crumples it into a ball before >>dropping it that we >> >> will realize that something is >> >> wrong with the theory. >> Well, strictly speaking, something was wrong with the experiment >> design. Well, strictly speaking, both the theory and the experimental design were wanting. Of course, the point is that it is impossible to design an entirely perfect experiment unless you have some idea of what you are looking for, and what we look for is based, to some degree, on previous knowledge, hence the bias. >> "It turns out that ensuring that the treatment and control differ in >> just one aspect that tests the question ... is considerably more >> demanding". (p. 79, Valiela 2001) You bet your boots! >> >> That's the thing about theories: you can prove them correct as >> >> many times as you like >> Once again, the word "prove" is incorrectly used. (Concedo; my >> apologies) ....Most of "science" (modern sense of the word) is not >> "science" (thomist sense of the word), but opinion (i.e. probable >> knowledge). I think that "opinion" is short selling natural science a bit. I would settle for "well-founded belief." >> ...But a good scientist would have only concluded "that when you >> weigh the whole thing after the candle has burnt down... Yes, I completely agree, but I think you might be missing my point: There is a possibility that any theory will be proved wrong. Your example using conservation of mass is particularly apt, since it has been recently demonstrated that at the smallest scales, matter and energy are interconvertable! One example of this is the collision of a particle of matter with a particle of antimatter in an accelerator. The result of the reaction is the destruction of both pieces of matter and the creation of pure energy in the form of photons. A reverse example is a phenomenon known as "pair production" which is the direct conversion of radiant energy into matter, specifically the materialization of an electron and a position in the vicinity of an atomic nucleus when it is stimulated with electromagnetic energy. As a matter of fact, according to the Encyclopedia Britannica, this is one of the principal methods of absorption of high-energy gamma rays in matter. Who would have known? What we thought was a hard and fast certainty turned out to be wrong under certain conditions! >> >> then I have turned my hypothesis into a true theory, which can >> >> then be tested. >> For some reason, I think you've flipped "theory" and "hypothesis". >> But I agree with your explanation, of course. I don't think so. At least, not according to the definitions currently prevalent in that portion of the academic community to which I am habitually exposed. Of course, the definition of all words is fundamentally arbitrary. >> >> our entire knowledge of the world is based only on >> >> theories >> Nego, but then because of your incorrect definition of >> "science", that is understandable. En guarde! I assert that there is nothing wrong with my definition of "science," and, in fact, I believe that my definition is far more prevalent in both the scientific community and the general population than your definition. While I've got my dictionary out, let's see what it says on the subject: "science, n. ... 2. systematic knowledge or study of the physical or material world." Just because one happens to use a word in a sense slightly different from the sense another person happens to prefer, does not mean that the usage is incorrect per se. >> "same rigor"? Far more rigor! (for some parts of philosophy) Concedo. >> Philosophy of Nature is not the same thing as experimental science. Concedo >> >> Why have two words which mean the same thing, when a useful >> >> distinction can be made between them...? >> Because if philosophy isn't a science, neither is modern >> experimental science. See my comments above for Criteriology. Well, this is true only if one refuses from the get-go to use the other definition!!! Assume that one definition of the word "elevator" is "anything which elevates." This definition includes car jacks and window-washer platforms. You then propose a restricted definition of the word, for the sake of convenience, meaning "only this contraption inside buildings with doors and buttons and stuff which is designed to elevate passengers..." I then object that this definition is unacceptable because "if a window-washer platform is not an elevator, then neither is an Otis Model 5!" Well...yeah...but only by the old definition!! How about, from now on, whenever I write the word "science," you read "natural science"? Otherwise, I will have to start referring to it as "nscience" to avoid confusion. >> >> I do not mean to disparage non-experimental science >> That is a contradiction in terms. "Experimental" in the sense of >> "being in contact with reality" is absolutely necessary for science, >> any science. Concedo. >> Hum, here again, you seem to be infected with Post-Modernism and a >> lack of knowledge of "What is Morality". But we'd need to have many >> hot chocolates and long discussions together. You're too kind! :-) Let's table the subject, as you suggest. >> >> Response to "100% of all religions are false (± 1%)" >> >> www.inquisition.ca/en/philo/artic/cent_pour_cent.htm >> >> By the way, does this include Roman >> >> Catholicism? >> Yes, in the 1 percent. Ah, I thought you meant: "100% of each religion is false (+/- 1%)" >> >> I think there is not a God.» >> Why? Because even though I opine that there is, I have no way of verifying it. Be aware that I use "God" in a different sense from "god," the existence of which I believe can be proven, depending upon the definition used. See postscript. >> >> I assert that the ultimate degree of knowledge >> >> about the world itself is unattainable by humans >> Well, how could you make such an ultimate assertion? We cannot know >> absolute truth about the world itself, and you're making an >> assertion about the world itself (i.e., that we can't know it >> fully). No, I make no assertions about the world itself. I do not suggest that I have perfect knowledge about the form of the world in order to thereby declare that its form is unknowable! My statement does not conflict with my professed uncertainty about the form which the outside world takes, because it does not arise from any knowledge of the world. Rather it arises from knowledge about the means which I am using to gain knowledge of the world. Knowing these methods, I can state that even if the world itself were perfectly knowable (which I think it is), our methods would not be sufficient to that end. Bear in mind, I do not state that it is impossible to hold perfect knowledge about the world. What I am saying is this: It is impossible to be perfectly certain that our knowledge of the world is perfect. In other words, if I say that my hand has five fingers, this knowledge may indeed reflect perfect knowledge of the world (of which there is an absolute truth), but I cannot be absolutely certain that it does. >> >> I hold, like Descartes, >> >> that all knowledge of the outside world is purely theoretical. >> Well, I don't think Descartes would have agreed with you (and I >> certainly don't!) Nolo contendere. I have never read Discourse in its entirety, and even if I had, I have a feeling that you would disagree with the theory no matter the name of the person professing it! :-) >> >> This is what I call «belief.» >> Incorrectly. *grumble*.....concedo >> The word "opinion" was invented and used for millenia before you and >> I appeared. I'm not inventing that word or its correct meaning. Mmmmmrrrg. Concedo. >> Reasons to believe are given in the part of Theology called >> "Apologetics". There are many good books on the topic, some are >> listed in my "Some Good Books" section. If people could be educated merely by referring them to their local library, then we would have no need of universities. They don't teach this stuff at my university, which is why I'm bugging you! >> >> This is what I would call a «reasonably reliable theory.» >> Hum. You're losing me here. So it seems. Ground control to Major Tom! Come in! ;-) >> >> the husband does not have personal experience which would confirm >> >> the veracity of his wife's assertion, but he does know that on >> >> almost every previous occasion in his memory, an assertion made >> >> by his wife subsequently proved to be true. >> That's exactly what I'm saying. The husband has evidence about the >> intelligence and good will of his wife, but no evidence whatsoever >> about what is in the fridge. Yes, that is exactly what you're saying, but its not what I'm saying!! :-) I'm saying that you do have evidence about what is in the fridge. It doesn't necessarily matter about the intelligence and good will of the wife. You have a conduit of information (wife) which has proved reliable in the past, when it was tested. This is evidence of the general reliability of that conduit of information. The wife saying that there is a ham in the fridge is a bit like looking through an electron microscope; we cannot directly see the things that are examined under the microscope, but there are other reasons to believe that what is under the microscope is what truly exists, and this has been confirmed on many occasions. The intelligence and will of the wife certainly do enter into it, but even without knowledge of intelligence and will, a conduit of information (e.g. our eyes) can be proved reliable through repeated testing. On the flip side of the same coin, suppose that you look at your hand, and you see five fingers. How do you know that you do in fact have five fingers? We are all familiar with optical illusions, some of which are very impressive, and which, before you had seen them, you might have no reason to believe would exist. If you want to be truly boggled by the shocking unreliability of your own senses, then I highly suggest that you have a look at the checker shadow illusion in particular, but also the simultaneous contrast illusion, the scintillating grid illusion, and the Mueller-Lyer illusion. In other words, it is at least conceivable for our senses to be unpredictably unreliable. Right? You can't just say, "Well, I just do know that my eyes tell the truth. It's true." You would ideally use other methods to count the number of fingers. For example, you could tap your fingers one at a time upon a drum, and count the number of beats with your ears. In this case, the information which our eyes have given us has been independently tested. You should ideally use many different methods of making this determination, each of which has a small probability of error, and repeat them many times. In this way, the possibility that our senses deceive us can be reduced to an inconceivably low statistic. But theoretically, error is always possible. >> >> This is the same as any other induction, is it not? >> No, not at all. Yes! Yes at all! If that isn't an induction, then I've been led astray by every person who has ever explained the concept of induction to me. If you wish to help, please feel free. >> >> and could swear that you remember seeing eggs, only to return and >> >> find no eggs! >> Concedo, but for dollar bills in my wallet! :-D But you do see what I am saying, right? Your personal recollection is not necessarily irrefutable proof itself, either. You somewhat arbitrarily put personal experience in the one in one category and information received from the wife inthe other in another category. If the husband knew himself to be notoriously absent minded and forgetful, he might very well count the wife's assertion as more reliable than his own recollection! >>If you're standing in the middle of a highway, and there is a car >>coming toward you, you will be crushed if you stay there and the car >>hits you. There is no uncertainty there. That's not a theory. That's it! I am going to put this issue to bed once and for all! Here we go. Please read what follows carefully. In addition, I will mark sections of my argument with this fun little symbol: ~ These symbols shall denote parts of my argument to which I believe that you must respond (1) specifically, (2) plainly, (3) directly, and (3) comprehensively, if you wish to attack my argument. To take a slightly less gruesome variation of the same scenario, suppose we suspend an apple above the ground, and drop it. Will it fall to the ground? The truth may be that objects always fall to earth. But let's assume that you are new to this world, and do not know this yet. What can you say about apples? You can merely say, "Every apple I have seen dropped, I observed fall to earth."~ Indeed, the best that natural science can do is give us the following statement: "Apples are always observed to fall to the earth."~ From this, we can induce, "Apples will always fall to the ground."~ But are there some apples floating around out there? There might be, for all that we can say, although we have observed so many objects fall to earth without exception, that we can say it is practically impossible, in our estimation. Yet, it takes the certainty of the mentally constructed theory to make the absolute statement, which has been inferred from the facts~ using a philosophical method (logic). You still disagree with me, don't you? You're stubborn! The best and the brightest scientists profess that we don't really know exactly what gravity is, or how it works (at least we can assume this for the sake of argument). We just know that it is there, and we have some empirical information about how it has been observed to behave~ from which we have constructed the theory of gravity. Therefore, your profession that you know with absolute positive complete double-doobie certainty that the apple will fall to the earth cannot~ be based on any knowledge of the mechanism of gravity itself, since nobody knows the mechanism. Your knowledge, rather, is based purely on the theory of gravity which we have developed after many, many, many observations.~ Every apple you have ever seen has fallen to earth. These observations provide information from which a mental image of the truth can be formed, which we have inferred from the facts. We can be absolutely certain of this theory in our own minds, but every natural theory is limited by the facts which have informed it,~ and the reality is that watching an apple fall every time you drop it is not per se an absolute guarantee that it will fall the next time.~ From our theory, we can deduce that any apple will fall. Would I bet my life on it? Of course. Might the truth be that apples always fall to earth? Yes, and I would bet that it is. But science does not show us these truths directly; we must synthesize the theory ourselves, based upon repeated observations.~ Let's take a well-known metaphor to drive the point home, shall we? Learning about the external world is a bit like learning to play chess from observing the game, but without having ever been given any instructions. You notice certain things right away. Other things you notice later, and cannot explain immediately. Then, just when you think that you have the whole thing figured out, a black bishop changes color for no apparent reason. Similarly, when we learn about the world, there is a learning curve approaching an asymptote. The problem is, there is no way to know with absolute certainty where we are standing on this curve. Phew! If I can't get you to agree with me after all of that, then I don't know what I'm going to do! Phew! I'm too pooped to write a postscript right now. Ask me about St. Augustine and his proof of God's existence next time! Yours sincerely, Mr. X11
-----Original Message-----
From: Stefan Jetchick
Sent: 19 avril 2008 20:01
To: Mr. X11
Subject: Response
Hello Mr. X11,
>> I like your system of
>> "Concedo/Nego/Distinguo" and have decided to try it myself.
Good, but remember that system was considered very old, in the
days of Saint Thomas Aquinas! (i.e. it's not my system)
>> none of Thonnard's works are to be
>> found in any of the Five College library systems...
Sad.
But perhaps something even better already exists in English,
and I just haven't found it yet.
>> I have given the revised the question the "blockhead test" (I read it).
>> It is still seems to say, with perfect clarity, exactly what I thought
>> it said before.
OK. But now I'm willing to defend it.
>> According to at least one source, this is wrong. There are indeed
>> 2 types of analogy, and "analogy of proportion" and "analogy of
>> attribution" are both subtypes of the second kind.
First problem: not all authors agree on the terminology, even if they
agree on what the terminology points to.
Second problem: The quoted Catholic Encyclopedia article is a bit
confusing in its examples.
Third problem: Saint Thomas Aquinas is a bit confusing in his examples.
After re-reading:
- the article in the Catholic Encyclopedia
- Summa Theologica, Ia pars, q. 13, a. 5 and a. 10
- De Veritate, q. 2, a. 11
- Thonnard on the topic of analogy
I still think Thonnard is right, and what is said in the Catholic
Encyclopedia is partly unclear, and partly totally compatible with
Thonnard. I'll quote Thonnard at length (in English), and you can
compare and see for yourself.
§82) Division of analogy. To make precise this general idea of analogy,
authors have proposed various classifications. Here is, it seems,
the clearest, inspired from Thomistic doctrine.
First, there are two main forms of analogy: that of attribution and
that of proportionality.
1) The analogy of attribution is when the signified nature is
appropriate firstly to one of its inferiors (the supreme analogate), and
is attributed to the others because of a causal relation. For example,
health that is said of a healthy man, of a healthy food, of a healthy
color, is mainly appropriate to man, then to food because it's the
efficient cause of health, to color because it's the cause of our
knowledge that something is healthy, etc. We can see that the causal
relation can be taken in a very broad sense to motivate this analogy.
2) The analogy of proportionality is when the various natures signified
are gathered under the same term by a resemblance of proportions or
of qualitative relations included in that nature. For example, by
considering life in itself, what the cell does in the material order,
intelligence does in the spiritual order: for both of these, there is
vital assimilation, immanent activity. The expression "proportionality"
alludes to mathematical relations between numbers; this comparaison is
helpful; but we are talking here about qualitative relations, i.e.
between various degrees of perfection, and not of quantity, which
requires a way of thinking which is far more flexible and nuanced.
[SJJ adds: Take the relations "2 is to 1 what 10 is to 5". In both
cases, we are talking about "double". 2 is the double of 1, like
10 is the double of 5. Except the word "double" in this case is taken
perfectly univocally! The word "double" means exactly the same
thing, whether we are comparing 2 to 1, or 10 to 5! There is no analogy
strictly speaking here! That is why we have to be careful with the
mathematical ratios given by Saint Thomas as "examples". They are
not examples strictly speaking.]
To better understand this analogy of proportionality, we have to
distinguish two forms.
a) The proper (SJJ: or "strict") analogy of proportionality
is when the signified mode of being is realized in all the inferiors
according to the same definition; thus life, defined as an immanent activity,
can be found in the living cell, in man's created intelligence, or in
the infinite thought of God.
b) The metaphorical (or improper) analogy of proportionality
is when the signified mode of being is appropriate in the proper
sense (according to its definition) only to one single category of
inferiors, and to the others, according to some accidental similitude
only. Thus "foot" is said analogically of man and of the mountain,
because there is a similarity of function between the base of one and
the other; but in the proper sense the foot as a means of locomotion only
pertains to man, and to attribute it to the mountain, we have to change
its definition (Nevertheless there is no analogy of attribution, since
there is no causal relation between man's foot and the foot of the
mountain.) To make a long story short, in this last case, we're
speaking metaphorically and we're getting closer to equivocity: the
same term designates two concepts which each express a different nature.
On the contrary, in the proper analogy of proportionality, the same
term corresponds to a single concept, as in univocity; we have in
our minds a same nature which will be usable as a point of comparaison
(as a middle term) to discover a new scientific truth by reasoning.
But this unity of the objective analog concept causes a problem: How
can it be reconciled with the diversity of degrees of perfection in
the inferiors, whereby the analog is distinguished from the univocal?
Reconciliation would indeed be impossible, if the object of thought
represented by the concept was an absolute nature, requiring everywhere
the same degree of being, as is the case for the univocal; animality,
for example, in a dog as in a man, has the same degree of perfection,
that of sensitive knowledge. But in the analog, the object thought
is a relative nature, able to remain the same and keep its unity,
while identifying itself with totally different degrees of perfection.
This is what we illustrate by comparing it with some properties
of numbers; the double, for example, designates many very different
numbers, not all, but all the even numbers; 10 is a double (i.e. of
5), and 36 is a double (i.e. of 18): the double is a relative
notion, a similitude of quantitative proportions. But, by the analog
concept, we think of something similar in the qualitative order; life
for example, doesn't designate an absolute nature, but a similitude
of relations between material assimilation of food by the cell, and
the psychological assimilation of the object known by the mind. By
signifying thus a relative property, the analog concept can keep
a true unity, one same definition (at least in the broad sense, since
strictly speaking a definition assumes a proximate genus and
specific difference, i.e. univocity), while expressing at the same time
diverse degrees of perfection, like the body and the mind, the finite
and the infinite.
3) We also distinguish the analogy of attribution in the strict sense,
and in the broad sense.
The first, (strictly speaking), is when the signified nature only
pertains properly (according to its definition) to the supreme
analogate; thus health can only realize the definition in the living,
like man, and not in the color or the food.
The second sense (broadly speaking) is when the attributed mode of
being appears in all the inferiors with its definition, even though
it is appropriate first of all supereminently to the supreme analogate.
But in this case, the attribution virtually contains an analogy of
proportionality which is the only one which can explain, as we've said,
identity at various degrees of one relative mode of being. Thus life
attributed to God and to living creatures can be classified as an analogy of
attribution, because divine life is the cause participated by all
created life; but there is also at the same time proportionality,
such that not only God, but also those creatures are formally living.
We conclude that only proper analogy of proportionality, along with
univocity, provides concepts usable to think correctly and build
the sciences.
Whew! I need an aspirin. (But I still think Thonnard is clearer than
the Catholic Encyclopedia on this one.)
>> an analogous sense of the word "knowledge" is not of any great help
>> to us at this moment
Well, I got a bunch of "Concedos" out of you so far, so I'll let
time do its work at this moment.
>> the concept of
>> mathematics is internal to our own minds. It is a mental construct
>> which has no parts that we have not assigned to it.
Hum. Last time I read about the Philosophy of Mathematics, I
needed another aspirin. I probably would partly agree with you. But
in Math, "(a) notions and fundamental definitions have a special character,
half experimental, half ideal; (b) then, the directing principles of
demonstration are not only like axioms, a simple application of the first
principles of reason, but they can also have the more complexe character
of postulates [...which] moderate the ideal and constructive character
of mathematics".
But I'm wading in water too deep for my fishing boots here, and I
don't even have a translated Thonnard to hang on to avoid drowning.
>> When speaking of the outside natural world, our ability to be certain
>> is based on an imperfect process of discovery.
... and that statement of yours is certain? i.e. based on a
perfect process of discovery?
>> if you were living in Jones' compound, and [if] you had no way of
>> separating his true statements from his false ones, then for practical
>> purposes, everything he said would be 100% worthless.
Concedo, with the added if.
>> I myself have spent a few hours hunched over a phase-contrast microscope
>> looking at little swimming friends, and I can say that they will
>> occasionally pull the "refrigerator eggs" trick on me!
:-)
But you can get the same effect with a real refrigerator and real
eggs, just by staying up 48 hours in a row, or being seriously ill,
or having some sort of eye disease. In other words, you need to know
your "instrument" to avoid misusing it.
I'm assuming you've already read:
Error: "Our Senses Deceive Us!"
>> I assert that the collection of facts by itself
>> is insufficient to enable us to approximate this truth. (See my
>> previous email where I spoke about Mycobacterium tuberculosis and
>> princes in disguise.)
If you mean: "The mere mechanical collection of sense-experience is not
sufficient to attain truth", I think I could Concedo. Yes,
at some point of time, a mind has to know the perfect connection between
the 5 fleshy thingamabobs dangling in front of our face and the sentence
"my hand has five fingers".
But you seem to assert the scientific method (for experimental sciences
that are subalternated to mathematics) is inserted between
all sense-experience and all knowing of truth.
But then I'm not sure.
>> You're teasing me! [Jesus Christ is the Truth]
Yes and no.
For us, "truth" is when our mind conforms to reality. So if I really
have 5 fingers on my hand, and I look at my hand and observe I have
5 fingers, I know truth.
But God, by knowing my hand, makes it exist with its 5 fingers. Truth
is reality constantly being created conformant to His mind!
Weird, but deeply interesting.
>> I merely argue that we can never be certain that any of our
>> perceptions are, in fact, perfectly accurate.
OK, how about I swing by Amherst for a visit, and I'll perform
the following experiment:
2) Do you doubt that truth exists?
Seriously, if we can never know whether any of our perceptions
are correct, we can never know truth. By conceding that truth
could exist, you're just adopting the typical "a-gnostic" stance
of Positivism. It apparently looks good during a cocktail party to
say: "I am perfectly content with the concept of an ultimate truth.
I don't even argue that it is impossible to have a perfectly accurate
perception of that truth". It makes you look like a nice guy. But
when you add: "we can never be certain that any of our perceptions are,
in fact, perfectly accurate", you're prattling what the PoMos
(Post-Modernists) have indoctrinated you with.
Shall we experiment? I'll bring bags of ice to reduce the pain of my
hand, after slapping you as hard as I can!
;-)
(By the way, notice that experiment was first suggested to a rabid
Atheist, then a rabid Evangelical Protestant, which I find amusing!)
>> This is why no natural
>> scientific question will ever be closed with complete finality
Here again, you insert the scientific method (for experimental sciences
that are subalternated to mathematics) between all sense-experience
and all knowing of truth, which is not always the case.
>> How very Aristotelian of you! Although I might be inclined to believe
>> that it is no "accident."
:-)
"Accident" is used technically in my statement. I'm assuming you're
familiar with the 10 categories of Aristotle?
>> Mmm, you sound awfully resolute for such an arbitrary statement.
>> Perhaps a better statement might be: "Logic has been divided in two
>> by this author, who then chooses, in his work, to designate his final
>> subdivision as..." By another system, logic is divided into:
>> informal, formal, symbolic, and mathematical.
Distinguo. Various authors have asserted various statements
about Logic: Concedo.
If you claim Logic is thus unsuitably divided, we can examine that.
We need to look at why other authors have divided differently.
Often what happens is that such apparently diverging opinions are
more compatible than it seems.
>> As an interesting side note, it has been suggested by some that
>> Descartes inserted his statements on the existence of God in order
>> to appease the censors.
:-)
You have to look at his whole system to see that it crumbles without
God.
But I didn't know Descartes personally, so I can't vouch for his
Catholicism. I've never seen anything that would cast doubt on the
sincerity of his Faith. Moreover, you can look at what Cartesianism
turns into when it's not held back by Catholic Faith (Spinoza).
>> On its face, this would seem to be roundabout way of insulting human
>> reason, rather than a condemnation of presumption of truth based only
>> on authority, especially when Aquinas goes on to say, "...for although
>> the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet
>> the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the
>> strongest."
I'm not sure I understand how you could see that as insulting human
reason.
Aquinas is just repeating standard dialectics:
"This endoxal material presents a certain hierarchy. Lacking ideas
actually admitted by everybody, reason will also consider as a legitimate
starting point the ideas admitted by most, or only by the wise, and there
again preferably by all the wise, or most, or by those considered wisest.
[...]
It's in this endox that the dialectician, according to Aristotle,
will find his proper evidence. The most conspicuous feature of this
substitute evidence is to lack a direct grip on the things themselves.
When a principle is recognized as legitimate, because it's endoxal, we
don't base ourselves on the evidence that things conform to it, but we
base ourselves on the experience that man, starting with sense
observations, has a strong tendency to conceive things in that way."
[The Articulation Of Aristotelian Dialectic]
Basically, it's better to be able to open your eyes and observe your
hand has five fingers, than to have to trust some "expert" who claims
your hand has five fingers. Why? Because your faculties of knowing
are placed directly in front of the facts! "Cut out the middle man!"
:-)
As for God, whose faculties of knowing are infinitely good, and who
can never be fooled by the "eggs in the fridge trick", His statements
are the best of them all. (Of course, the difficulty becomes finding
out which statements were really made by God, and which are just
lies invented by men. But in theory, if a statement was made
by God, it is supremely trustworthy.)
>> >> There must be some good book out there about science.
>> I do not feel qualified to nominate a specific text.
But, what are you studying in? English Literature? Basket weaving?
If you're doing some degree in experimental science, you must know
what you're doing!
(I'm teasing you a bit, here! But also, you either have faith in
science, which is unscientific, or you know what science is, and
can point to good books or a good book on the topic, the same way
I can.)
>> >> God isn't a jerk, so He supplies the Magisterium to make sure the
>> >> interpretation process is correct.)
>> Does he?
Well, think about it. Assuming God exists (and "God" strictly speaking,
someone perfectly good, perfectly wise, etc.), would He throw some
paper rag at us and watch us interpret it all wrong?
I guess that would be the "analytical approach". Then you can try
the "empirical approach": read all the official teachings of the
Catholic Church for the past 2000 years, and plot them on sophisticated
charts. First observation: remarkable stability, even in periods
where Popes are complete dirtbags (as in guys who make babies with
married women, and nominate their bastards as Cardinals, etc.)
Second observation: phenomenal resistance to social fashions (e.g.
continuing to condemn contraception, despite huge movement to "legalize"
it, same with sodomy, abortion, etc.) A sociologist can observe all the
mainstream Protestant churches succumbing to the Culture of Death in this
century. But the Catholic Church still stands strong.
You can also read the Bible, and compare the Old Testament with the
New Testament. Imagine, Christians claim that the proof their
religion is true is located in the Sacred Scriptures of another
religion! (Judaism) All fraudulent "prophets" (Jim Jones, David Koresh,
Mahomet, etc.) just show up and claim God sent them. Jesus has
people announce His coming, in writing, for millenia before He shows up!
Pretty neat trick! Try it! Find some existing religion that has been
around for thousands of years, then insert yourself into prophecies
you didn't write and have no control over!
You can also compare the official teachings of the Magisterium with
Science! Yes, you are automatically excommunicated if you deny the
capacity of human reason to attain certain truth without religious faith!
(The Church defends human reason.) And guess who invented Universities?
The Church, of course!
Etc., etc... But here our discussion is not about Apologetics.
>> I was trying to say that the conclusions to which logic
>> leads us in specific cases can often be verified (at least in natural
>> science). Therefore, the use of logic does not introduce an unknown
>> variable into our conclusions, since the conclusions can often be
>> tested to some degree through direct observation. It is no doubt true
>> that the development of logic must be guided by observation, and the
>> scientific method ensures that these observations are as accurate and
>> frequent as possible.
Huuuuummmmm. Not sure.
>> Are you? Tell me, how do you know you perceive correctly?
See experiment above.
>> Have you
>> ever seen optical illusions?
Yep. Have you ever wondered why we all call them "illusions", with
great certainty?
;-)
>> My point being, our senses are fallible,
>> and we are not even aware of all of the things which affect them, or
>> whether we are currently being affected.
Did I mention my literary masterpiece called:
Error: "Our Senses Deceive Us!"
>> it is
>> impossible to control for all possible variables in any experiment
>> involving the natural world (and I include our eyes as part of this
>> natural world).
Here again, you are making a very bold statement about an absolute
truth. You need to: #1 justify how you can assert with certainty
that we can never assert with certainty; and #2 pass the experiment
described above.
>> This is the reason why it is impossible to develop
>> the "perfect experiment"
Hum! That's a catchy name! "The Perfect Experiment!"
Yes, I like it!
>> But that does not mean that I can make the
>> statement with the same certainty as cogito ergo sum.
Wait until I've translated Thonnard's Criteriology.
>> My hand is not
>> something which dwells within my mind
How can you be so sure?
;-)
>> All of the information about my hand comes to me
>> through conduits of information which might not be absolutely
>> accurate.
How can you be so sure?
Another way of putting it is: "Doubt is good, but as long as you
really doubt, seriously doubt, diligently doubt." In other words,
you also have to doubt your doubt.
Then you need to perform the Perfect Experiment and read up on
Criteriology.
>> Proof: Evidence sufficient to establish a theory as true, according
>> to a given level of rigorousness, which may be absolute or somewhat
>> less than absolute.
Hum, interesting. Here are a few of my thoughts, after comparing the
RHCD ("Random House College Dictionary") definition with Thonnard's.
First, a good definition is a proximate genus and specific difference.
(Example: "Man is an animal endowed with reason and free will".) Here,
RHCD seems to say the genus of "proof" is "evidence". We have already
seen how ambiguous that word is, in modern mouths. If we take "evidence"
in the modern sense, then it is equivalent to saying: "A proof is something
that makes us consider an assertion as more or less probable." First,
the word "something" is not exactly a proximate genus! Second,
a proof is precisely not a clue or an argument in favor of. It's
much more than that.
Second, RHCD seems to say a "proof" concerns a "theory", i.e. it establishes
a theory as true. Except you've been saying all along that a theory can
never be proven true. So the definition of "proof" becomes: "Something
sufficient to establish a theory as being what it is unable to be".
;-)
>> Hypothesis: A rational conjecture
"Conjecture" is a synonym for "hypothesis". In other words, not a
"proximate genus".
>> A good
>> theory must [...] make testable predictions about observations
So must a hypothesis, otherwise it cannot "guide investigation"
>> In addition, the theory must not conflict
>> in any of its parts with other theories
So must a hypothesis, otherwise it cannot "guide investigation"
>> Hypothesis: [...] a possible explanation
>> accounting for known facts or phenomena.
So must a theory, otherwise it cannot be used as a "principles
of explanation for a phenomenon or class of phenomena".
Thonnard talks about "general hypothesis" and "special hypothesis"
to account for these similarities.
Seriously, once again, I need to translate Thonnard.
>> I think that "opinion" is short selling natural science a bit. I would
>> settle for "well-founded belief."
In a way, we can define words any way we want, and have an intelligent
conversation. Just as long as you and I agree what we mean by such
and such a word.
In another way, you are just the victim of "magna est vis consuetudinis"
(great is the force of habit). You've just been accustomed to an
incorrect use of the words "opinion" and "belief".
>> There is a possibility that any theory will be proved wrong.
Theory: large five-fingered entities travelling at high velocity can
really slap hard!
:-)
But seriously, if you reduce the number of assertions you consider
as "theories", to restrict them to some conclusions of some
sciences known as "empirio-metric sciences", Concedo.
>> matter and
>> energy are interconvertable!
Thonnard says that, strictly speaking, that is not true.
>> and the creation of pure energy in the form of photons.
Careful with your use of words. See "Creation" in Verbal Inflation
and Impoverished Thought and Section 2.3 in How To Evolve
A Debate Against A Darwinist.
>> What we thought was a hard and fast
>> certainty turned out to be wrong under certain conditions!
Don't get all "reved-up" too quickly!
>> >> >> I think you've flipped "theory" and "hypothesis".
>> I don't think so.
See above.
>> En garde! I assert that there is nothing wrong with my definition
>> of "science"
Wow, man! You're using French! I have to agree with you here!
:-D
>> I believe that my definition is far more
>> prevalent in both the scientific community and the general
>> population than your definition.
Why "believe" when you can know?
Sociological inquiries, using the scientific method adapted
to studing large groups of human persons, would prove beyond
a shadow of a doubt that your definition "is far more
prevalent in both the scientific community and the general
population".
Then, after establishing that, we can think about the consequences
of defining "Science" as "that which the majority considers
as science". Remember Section 3.2 of Public Enemy #1: Religious
Obscurantism? This logically means that if the majority
considers Witchcraft to be a science, then Witchcraft is a science!
Then, we can compare your definition of Science with Thonnard's,
and see which one passes The Perfect Test of common sense and
logic.
>> Just because one happens to use a word in a sense slightly different
>> from the sense another person happens to prefer, does not mean that
>> the usage is incorrect per se.
Concedo.
Except I'm not defending "what I happen to prefer", and you're not
defending a "slightly different sense". I'm defending common sense
and logic against a colossal perversion of science.
(Well, OK, this debate is public, so we have to make it interesting
for readers! Call it the "Oprah-fication" of Philosophy"! :-)
>> How about, from now on, whenever I write the word "science," you read
>> "natural science"?
Because science includes philosophy (the general science) and all the
particular sciences (biology, chemistry, physics, sociology, etc.).
>> Ah, I thought you meant: "100% of each religion is false (+/- 1%)"
OK, I had not thought about that interpretation! Funny how another
pair of eyes can have such a different interpretation!
>> Rather it arises from knowledge about the means which I am using to
>> gain knowledge of the world.
So the means you are using to know the world are out of this world?
How do you define "world"?
>> I say that my hand has five fingers, this knowledge may
>> indeed reflect perfect knowledge of the world (of which there is an
>> absolute truth), but I cannot be absolutely certain that it does.
Yes, that is exactly what I understood the first time. You claim
The Perfect Experiment can still leave you in a state of doubt.
I wish I had your fortitude. It might come in handy
some day!
>> I have never read The Discourse in its entirety
Actually, I kind of look forward to hearing your reaction to Thonnard's
assessment of The Discourse.
>> If people could be educated merely by referring them to their local
>> library, then we would have no need of universities.
ARRRRRRGHHHGHGHGHGHG!
Concedo! Actually, the biggest, most painful concedo I can grant!
One of my biggest frustrations in life is that most people just
couldn't be bothered with reading serious books. I absolutely agree with
you: pointing your finger to a bookshelf filled with good books is
totally insufficient to help somebody!
>> Yes, that is exactly what you're saying,
>> but its not what I'm saying!
Lord, we're having problems here!
:-)
>> I'm saying that you do have evidence about what is in the fridge.
No you don't.
Unless you define "evidence" incorrectly (which you do, well, actually,
which "that portion of the academic community to which [you are]
habitually exposed" does. So I can't blame you, just disagree with
you).
>> The wife saying
>> that there is a ham in the fridge is a bit like looking through an
>> electron microscope
You're weird!
:-)
Seriously, of course there are similarities. Let's try to sort this
out:
|
|
Wife |
Microscope |
|
Is a human person (i.e. self-aware, endowed
|
Yes |
No |
|
Can freely decide to start telling lies,
|
Yes |
No |
|
Can have evidence of something,
|
Yes |
No |
|
Can testify in court of past events, of which,
|
Yes |
No |
|
No amount of physical examination will tell
|
Yes (but physical
|
No |
|
etc., etc... |
|
|
>> How do you know that you do in fact have >> five fingers? See Perfect Experiment above. >> If you want to be truly >> boggled by the shocking unreliability of your own senses I'll let you be the stuntman. >> it is at least conceivable for our senses to be >> unpredictably unreliable. Right? Right. Hence the universal doubt in actu signato at the beginning of Criteriology (not in actu exercito). Then that doubt is eliminated scientifically. >> You can't just say, "Well, I just >> do know that my eyes tell the truth. It's true." You can just say that, but it would be unscientific (although it would be full of common sense). You need: "Critique or criteriology is the scientific examination of our spontaneous certitudes [...] criteriology is a scientific knowledge, which proceeds by rigorous demonstration, but it is not a separate science, being a part of Metaphysics" >> But theoretically, error is always >> possible. I'll let you be the stuntman. >> If that isn't an induction, then I've been led >> astray by every person who has ever explained the concept of induction >> to me. If you wish to help, please feel free. Pesker me to translate. >> If the husband knew himself to be notoriously absent minded >> and forgetful, he might very well count the wife's assertion as more >> reliable than his own recollection! Unless he forgot his wife was less absent-minded. ;-) >> Here we go. Please read what follows carefully. OK. >> In addition, I will >> mark sections of my argument with this fun little symbol: ~ Whopee! I love fun little symbols! >> To take a slightly less gruesome variation of the same scenario No. I like my scenario. It is Officially Endorsed® by real modern experimental scientists! >> suppose we suspend an apple above the ground, and drop it. Will it >> fall to the ground? If the protocol says: "Start by taking 3 milligrams of H2SO4", and you immediately say: "Hum, lets replace that with apple juice and continue with the rest of the protocol!" I give you a perfectly clear description of a scientific experiment, then you go and change that experiment and declare I'm wrong because the results are different! See, you are a bad scientist. ;-) Seriously, you cannot change the scenario. "Objects always fall to earth" is not the same thing as "Our senses, when healthy and placed in front of their proper object, do not deceive us". The first is a principle, the second a demonstrated conclusion of the science of criteriology. Principle: "Principles are presented as very general laws. Except they are not strictly speaking laws, since they are not demonstrated by the experimental method: their generality is opposed to this proof. They can be assimilated to postulates. Just as postulates remain indemonstrable by the deductive method of mathematics, principles are indemonstrable by the inductive method of experimental sciences. Their value requires that no experiment contradicts them and the ever increasing number of their consequences, constantly verified by the experimental method makes them more and more probable; but it would only require one new fact, always possible, to fragilize them. Their use is nevertheless very legitimate, since they unify a great number of laws and, under certain conditions, constitute the treatises into deductive systems or perfect sciences." >> "Every >> apple I have seen dropped, I observed fall to earth."~ Concedo. But beside the point. >> Indeed, the >> best that natural science can do is give us the following statement: >> "Apples are always observed to fall to the earth."~ Concedo. But beside the point. >> it takes the certainty of the mentally >> constructed theory to make the absolute statement, which has been >> inferred from the facts~ using a philosophical method (logic). Concedo. But beside the point. >> You still disagree with me, don't you? Not really, we're not disagreeing, just banging our heads on the fact I should have started translating Thonnard 25 years ago, instead of watching a zillion hours of stupid TV. >> The best and the brightest scientists profess that we don't really >> know exactly what gravity is Concedo. But beside the point. >> We just know that it is there, and >> we have some empirical information about how it has been observed to >> behave~ Concedo. But beside the point. >> Therefore, your profession that you know with absolute positive >> complete double-doobie certainty that the apple will fall to the earth >> cannot~ be based on any knowledge of the mechanism of gravity itself Concedo. But beside the point. >> since nobody knows the mechanism. Your knowledge, rather, is based >> purely on the theory of gravity which we have developed after many, >> many, many observations.~ Concedo. But beside the point. >> the reality is that watching an apple fall >> every time you drop it is not per se an absolute guarantee that it >> will fall the next time.~ Concedo. But beside the point. >> when we learn about the world, >> there is a learning curve approaching an asymptote. I'll let you approach the asymptote. >> there is no way to know with absolute certainty where we are standing >> on this curve. I sure know where I want to stand! >> Phew! If I can't get you to agree with me after all of that, then I >> don't know what I'm going to do! Really, the problem is caused by me. I'm still learning, and cannot yet clearly explain what I mean. Moreover, practically the only source I have isn't in English. (Well, everything Thonnard says can be found in Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, etc., which have all been translated. Moreover, as I've said, there could be far better Philosophy textbooks out there, I just haven't found them yet.) Anyway, sorry about all the virtual bitch-slapping. Maybe I should just say things like: "If one apple decided to fly instead of falling, but you could never be sure of your senses, how could you say your theory was proven false?" Cheers! Stefan
For the rest of the debate, see Correspondence with J. Ferenc, part 2
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